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Irresistible or "Irresisted" Impulse?'
Wladimir G. Eliasberg*
A FTER SO MUCH BICKERING between psychiatrists and lawyers,
a court of appeals stated that the latest development, the
Durham Rule, does not require a different examination by the
psychiatrist, but only a different examination of the psychiatrist
by the lawyer.2 In another decision quoted in the same case, the
court pointed out that "the value of an expert's testimony rests
upon the material from which his opinion is fashioned and the
reasoning by which he has progressed to his conclusion; the ex-
planation of the disease and its dynamics, that is, how it occurred,
developed and affected the mental and emotional processes of the
defendant" (italics added).
It is the purpose of this paper to show that the requirements
made on psychiatry have not changed in the least since the ap-
plication of the Durham Rule. It will be shown that now and
in the future as before, the demonstration of the development
and the dynamics of the mental processes is what the psychiatrist
has to offer. Questions of guilt are not in his province. Now as
before this latter remains the prerogative and obligation of the
finders of fact, not of the experts.
During those centuries when penal law was built on the
concepts of the criminal intent, criminal culpability and guilt,
there also was developed a kind of lawyers' psychology and
psychiatry from which were derived the tests to exclude guilt.
Exclusion of guilt would be the consequence of 'raving madness,'
irresistible impulse, lack of knowledge of right and wrong. One
* M.D., Ph.D., Diplomate in Psychiatry and Neurology; author of "Multi-
tudes, Moguls and Mindhealers"; and other books; contributor to "Present
Day Psychology," "Handbook of Correctional Psychology," "Encyclopedia
of Criminology," and other books; and author of more than 300 publications,
many on psychiatry and the law; formerly lecturer on forensic psychiatry
for the Munich Bar Ass'n.; visiting professor at the Academy of Political
Science in Prague; and lecturer in psychology at Rutgers University.
1 Permission has been granted by Psychiatric Quarterly to make use of a
previous article in 21 (1) Psych. Qu. Suppl. 102 (1947).
2 This decision quoted from Watson, Durham Plus Five Years: Develop-
ment of the law of Criminal Responsibility in the District of Columbia, 116
Am. J. Psychiat. 291 (1959). This excellent paper gives a survey of the be-
ginning change in the handling by the courts and the juries of cases in
which the pleas of not guilty on account of insanity is interposed. Cases on
the shift of the burden of proof, on the reluctance of the trial courts to ac-
cept the new rule, on the court's taking exception to the vagueness of the
concept of irresistible impulse are quoted. This should make good reading
for both psychiatrists and lawyers.
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need not dwell on the history of these tests3 because lawyers have
come to acknowledge-often reluctantly-that with isolated tests
little could be achieved. The hypothesis4 that someone could be
partially insane and otherwise responsible, that he could be in-
tellectually insane and emotionally sane and vice versa, has had
such grotesque consequences that, with a certain about-face, the
lawyers now keep turning to the psychiatrists to say whether
an indicted person is suffering from mental disease. If experts'
opinions oppose each other-so much the worse. There seemed to
be only the problem of having reliable experts render opinions.
However, the question of objective criteria that would be under-
standable to laymen was abandoned too early.
The impulsive character of an action does not in itself render
it unpunishable.
Table 1 shows that there are a great number of impulsive
actions where no irresponsibility may be claimed and the guilty
intent may be established by proving guilty intent or criminal
negligence either for the complete crime or overt action at the
stage of criminal attempt. The impunity of an impulse action
which would otherwise be a crime can be established on the
basis of certain objective criteria which in a single case need
not all be present and not all in the same degree. The idea of
the following sections then is to base the diagnosis on pre-existing
facts, i.e., facts demonstrating abnormality before, and in no con-
nection with, the crime. Likewise, a conscientious objector will
not be believed unless he can prove that his attitude existed
before induction.
Table 1
Punishable and Unpunishable Impulse Actions
I. Punishable impulse actions
A. Punishable normal impulsive actions: many crimes for
the purpose of gratification of impulse, carrying out a
guilty intent.
3 See, for the historical development-Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in
Criminal Law (1933) and Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law
(1935).
4 (a) First published in Eliasberg, W. G., Die abnorme Triebhandlung in
forensischer Beurteilung, 21 Monschr. f. Kriminal psychol. u. Strafrechts-
reform (1930).
(b) See also same author: The Acute Psychosexual Situation, 33 J.
Crim. Law and Criminol. 443 (1943); Opposing Expert Testimony, 36 J.




B. The abnormal impulsive action with full accountability to
law on the basis of "irresponsibility tests."
C. Punishable negligence* of persons who are no longer
"beginners" who, suffering from strong (uncontrollable)
nonpsychotic impulses, neglect to prepare for, or avoid,
such situations in which impulses have become over-
whelming.
II. Unpunishable impulse actions
A. Unpunishable normal impulsive actions
B. Unpunishable abnormal impulsive actions
1. Obsessive-compulsive actions within the frame of ob-
sessive-compulsion if found combined with clinical
psychosis, or disorder of consciousness, or dementia,
2. Other unpunishable abnormal sexual actions.
The impulse action is observed rather early in life. It per-
sists throughout life, little influenced by experience and social
surroundings.
It should, however, be noted that for an action to be im-
pulsive, it need not be congenital. Congenitality, or the heredi-
tary nature of an action is difficult to prove in human beings.
The results of maze experiments with rats can by no means be
easily transferred to humans. That a certain disposition is con-
genital, does not in itself make it non-punishable. Neither does
the fact that the deed is in keeping with the character guarantee
impunity. The controversy has been whether a deed should be
punished more severely because it is obviously in keeping with
the character and thus proves the moral turpitude of the perpetra-
tor or whether just because it is obviously a product of the evil-
doer's nature and nothing more, should be dismissed as free of
guilt. Cases where such controversies arise are those of sexual
perversions, particularly of homosexual misdemeanors and felo-
nies.
The normal urge shows developmental phases, as has been
demonstrated particularly in the psychoanalytic teachings on the
development of the sexual urge. The pathological urge often re-
mains at the early infantile stage and cannot be sublimated.
* For the concept of negligence, its handling in court and in the theory of
psychoanalysis and the right to punish negligence in impulsive actions, see
Eliasberg, Rechtspflege und Psychologie (1933).
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There is no formation of compounds between the urge and the
other aspects of the personality, his aims and his social attitudes.
The pathological urge is marked by abnormal intensity, be
it higher or lower than the average. It is not always easy to get
indicators of abnormal intensity. However, there is not too
seldom a strong tendency toward conversion into physical symp-
toms, dizziness, nausea, vasomotor reactions, fainting. Such con-
versions have rather indiscriminately been called hysterical.'
F. Alexander 6 has drawn attention to the fact that not all of
these symptoms are of conversional nature. There may be di-
vergencies from the normal merely along the line of vasomotor
abnormalities, with or without secondary psychoneurosis.7 The
better we learn to differentiate between hysterical conversion
and other types of psychogenic abnormality, the more the interest
of the lawyer will be served. However, there are types of in-
creased intensity of the urge which resemble definitely the hys-
terical type in abrupt and sudden changes. There is also a type
in which it is not some more or less conscious, i.e., psychological,
urge which is carried into physical symptoms. In this type, it
is primarily the physical symptoms-e.g., vasomotor ones-which
only secondarily are reflected in consciousness, but which, by a
short circuit, reach the vasomotorium.
Such a case was described by the writer.8 This was a 29-
year-old man who would form strong attachments to women of
what he called his type, only to detest them utterly the moment
that an affair became serious. He would then back out, only to
do anything possible to get the same woman back; as a pleasant
and good-looking fellow, he would repeatedly be successful. In
him, a vasomotor-cyclothymic constitution was alloyed with a
neurotic childhood attachment to his mother. This man, with all
his feelings of guilt, has never become criminal. But with the
distorted sex life he leads, the possibility exists that he might
turn to such symbolic sexual actions as exhibitionism, which
are beyond the threshold of the socially acceptable.
5 Freud, General Introduction to Psychoanalysis (1920).
6 Alexander, Fundamental Concepts of Psychosomatic Research, 5 Psycho-
som. Med. 205 (1943).
7 See also: Romano, and Engel, Studies of Syncope: III Differentiation be-
tween vasopression and hysterical fainting, 7 Psychosom. Med. 3 (1945).
8 Eliasberg, The Acute Psychosexual Situation, supra note 4; Eliasberg,
Closeup of Psychosexual Gratification, 99 J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 179 (1944);





In many cases, the abnormal urge is not more intense than
the normal; on the contrary, it is abnormally weak. One may
assume this to be the case with aged sexual criminals or with
the sexual crimes of children and youthful offenders or with
addicts or many homosexuals. The physical signs may be used
without Lombroso's prejudice for the measurement of the urge.
It should be anticipated that with general atrophy of the primary
and secondary sexual characteristics, as is normal in old age or
in menopause, there goes an abatement of general impulsiveness
and particularly sexual urge. And it is the exception if
... Thou rebellious hell
Canst mutine in a woman's bones.
-Hamlet
In a recent study9 on non-neoplastic hypergenitalism it was
found that in boys and girls with unusually strong and precocious
development of the secondary sexual characteristics there was a
certain passivity in the recreational interests. Delinquency,
truancy, and larceny were as often represented as sexual ir-
regularity. The general impression is that hypergenitalism does
not run parallel to hyperexcitability of the sexual or other urges.
Rather it seems to be the inhibitions that are disturbed.
Inhibitions of urges often are not of the specific type which
we know as the interplay of the agonists and antagonists in muscle
physiology. In contradistinction to this type, there is often an
inhibitory character in which the actualization of urges in gen-
eral and of any particular urge is inhibited. Inhibition, then, be-
comes a general set, a motivation which is built up, e.g., on the
basis of the moral convictions of the personality or of some psy-
chopathology; and, on the basis of such general moral in-
hibitions, are the specific urges inhibited.
It is the general inhibitory attitude which may deteriorate
under the influence of destructive pathology or short-lived patho-
logical processes or biological cycles. Such destructive pathology
may, in turn, occur in cycles or phases. The best examples of this
are organic epileptic deterioration or the so-called catastrophic
reaction (Kurt Goldstein) 10 in the emotional "brainstorms" of
brain disease. Apart from this periodicity, inhibitions, as noted
in the foregoing, may be reduced chronically in organic brain
conditions.
9 Taylor, and Schaefer, Non-neoplastic Hypergenitalism, 5 Psychosom.
Med. 10 (1943).
10 Goldstein, K., The Organism 35 (1939).
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1960
9 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
From the preceding it has already become clear that the
irresistible impulse should be discussed only in the context of
the psychophysical personality as a whole and particularly in the
context of pathological processes or stigmatizations. If we want
to declare a person not guilty on the ground that he committed
his deed because of an irresistible impulse we shall first have to
think of an acknowledged and clinically diagnosed mental dis-
order which would imply a generally disturbed mentality. Not-
withstanding this general remark, the details should be given
full attention.
In the abnormal urge, the aim, the object of the libido is
often abnormal. There is the longing for abnormal intoxications
or that for the gratification of abnormal sexual desires. Abnormal
aims may often be understood on the basis of comparative and
developmental psychology. Criminal impulsive actions of single
individuals of our civilization may point to the symbolic ritual
in primitive societies. This holds true for certain forms of im-
pulsive manslaughter. In our own society there are periods of
lessened inhibition during which usually unacceptable or abnor-
mal aims may be achieved. Such periodically or occasionally
conditioned abnormality may originate in wartime, in periods of
religious or political excitement, in election compaigns (election
"crusades") in connection with superstition, under conditions
when so-called superior white and inferior native cultures come
into contact, in mass situations, in mass distress, among migrating
uprooted hordes, in nostalgia, and many others. This catalogue
shows that both the individual and the mass may be susceptible
to such abnormalities. Developmental psychology of crime in
general and of the impulsive crime in particular, may become
an important contribution to knowledge in this field.
Both the abnormal and the normal urge and impulsive action
are characterized through endogenous periodicity and phases of
refractoriness interspersed between the manifestation phases. On
examination, one may find the following characteristic type: Al-
though opportunity for crime does not change, the abnormal
criminal impulse action shows a specific periodicity, in women,
for instance, coinciding with the phases of generative biology:
menstruation, childbearing, confinement. Other periodicities of
this type are those of the waking state and of sleep, and especial-
ly of the periods of falling asleep and gradually awakening. The




nality. There is also a periodicity in dipsomania, and other forms
of addiction.
Such periodicity points to the fact that extrinsic factors like
temptation and opportunity may not be decisive. However, mere
periodicity may lack the power to influence, just as outward con-
ditioning factors may lack it.
The periodicity may stem from the outward world or else
from semi-outward influences. Diabetics may acquire hyperin-
sulinism in connection with overdose of insulin. Hyperinsulinism
has been recognized lately as the cause of otherwise non-ac-
countable crimes of violence. The periodic dependency on drugs,
particularly the alkaloids, which so often leads to all sorts of
crimes is determined equally by external and internal factors.
The outward or phenotypical aspect of the impulse action
may be noted by either the subject or an observer or both. One
may deal first with the aspect that appears in the consciousness
of the subject himself. He may realize the emotion of the ab-
normal and of the normal impulsive act. The writer has described
the acute psychosexual situation as one which resembles in gen-
eral the reaction of living matter to a stimulus. Such a reaction
is never a direct, simple and true-to-life picture of the stimulus.
There may be quantitative overcompensation; the reaction is
often, qualitatively different from the stimulus. Nor is stimula-
tion a passive stage. It is, on the contrary, in the organic process
preceded by an active phase of Reizsuche, or at least by an active
selection among stimuli. After the passive stage the biological
response includes a stage of overcompensation which corresponds
to the final aggression of the sexual action. All this can be easily
distinguished fom the anorganic response, which-although not
without exception to the rule-resembles the stimulus in the way
counterpressure resembles pressure; i.e., counterpressure is not
overcompensation. Counterpressure only restores the equilib-
rium without any aggression (overcompensation) and generally
without an exhaustive or refractory phase. To put it briefly, the
graphs of the sexual action follow those of the biological organic
response. There develop as characteristic patterns in every adult,
male or female, successions of masochistic and aggressive phases
and collapse. Whenever there is a succession of amorousness and
violence, tenderness and hate, gift and wound, a quick succession
at that, with or without final collapse, one may diagnose a fully
developed or developing psychosexual situation. This criterion
has been made use of as corroborative evidence in cases against
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adults in which a child is the only witness." The graph of the
emotional concomitants of the impulse action as experienced by
the subject or more or less indirectly observed by a third person,
resembles the emotional response. 1 2 That man does not enjoy
what he possesses is stressed by all the pessimistic philosophies;
the moment the wish is fulfilled, the possessed object no longer
satisfies. In other words, neither the aggressive nor the mas-
ochistic phase can survive collapse and exhaustion; and there is
no lasting gratification. Every impulse is of short duration, par-
ticularly if gratified. Even if not gratified, it is short lived. While
this holds for gratification of an impulse, gratification through the
achievement of a volition may last longer.
The characteristic difference between the normal volitional
act and the (normal or abnormal) impulsive act does not consist
in the full consciousness of the phases of the former (motive,
deliberation, decision). On the contrary, in the normal volitional
act, or rather in volitional orientation, there is much automatism,
and this is the more so as the volitional act reaches out for re-
mote aims. 0. Kulpe has, therefore, formulated a law of the
"automatized intermediate phases of the successful volition," and
J. Lindworsky in his survey' 3 of experimental investigations of
the will has pointed to the general confirmation by nearly all
workers in this field. The motives themselves also may be-
come automatic and this, as will be seen later, is a characteristic
of motivation as an habitual pattern and of our actions in habitual
and ordinary situations. The difference, then, between volition
and impulse rests with the remoteness of the aim in the former
and the narrow space, the split-second relationship in the latter.
It is not known whether in the abnormal impulse action the time
factor is different from that of impulse action in general. One
difference which is known is that in cases where discharge is
combined with dimming of consciousness, the normal conscious-
ness usually recurs immediately after the discharge. This leads
to the phenomena accompanying the dimming of consciousness
which may be connected either with complete amnesia or twi-
ll Supra note 4(a).
12 This has been discussed in Eliasberg, Graphology and Medicine, 100 J.
Nerv. Ment. Dis., 381, 392 (1944). For literature, see Luria, The Nature of
Human Conflict (1932) and Ebaugh, Association-motor Investigation in
Clinical Psychiatry, J. Ment. Sci. (1936). Further references are noted in
the article by Eliasberg.





light states or depersonalization or any form of mental dissocia-
tion.
Biologists have doubted the true dimming of consciousness.
If there is an inflexible urge, the whole milieu narrows down.
The individual's contacts are fewer. While the biologists may be
right with their theoretical objection, one may state that consci-
ousness is basically changed if fewer facts are grasped and that
there is also a physiological aspect of this.
In cases of dimming of consciousness the subject might not
experience the feelings which are characteristic of the obsessive
compulsions, i.e., that there is some strangeness, that there is an
active "non-ego," and so on. Phenomenally then, there is a
striking difference between the consciousness of the compulsion
and that of the impulse action.
In many cases of impulse action there will be no conscious-
ness of reasons, purposes, aims, motives, difficulties, counterveil-
ing factors or wrongfulness. In the impulse action one may not
expect the evil-doer to take precautions, to see to it that there
will be an alibi. The really impulsive sexual criminal will not buy
candies in advance to lure children; and one will not be able
to prove that he often repairs to places where he might find
children.
A general connotation, then, of the phenomenal sphere of the
urge is that the urge is experienced passively, that there is no
Reizsuche. The acute urge as such does not cause dimming of
consciousness; an urge which is normal even if most acute may
be excluded, whenever the dimming of consciousness can be
reliably proven.
There are some difficulties in the application of this rule.
Our experiences with others or with ourselves leave traces. We
evaluate our actions in the past, and we orient ourselves on our
own actions. This occurs not only with the fully conscious
intentional attitude but also with the impulsive and even
abnormal pathological action. Thus one can observe that peo-
ple take precautions, such as avoiding alcohol, if they know
that sexual, impulsive, punishable actions will be carried out
under alcohol. An elderly teacher, sensing the reawakening of
homosexual urges, applied for retirement before he again com-
mitted punishable acts. Self-prophylaxis is only possible, how-
ever, with impulsive actions which are touched off in certain
situations. Self-prophylaxis is impossible if the factors of in-
tensity and periodicity are unfavorable. It is, unfortunately, the
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most dangerous impulsive criminal who thus cannot apply self-
prophylaxis, apart from the fact that his low level of personality
and self-aspiration usually will not favor the formation of self-
prophylactic motivations.
In addition to the difficulty just mentioned, i.e., human ex-
perience becoming multi-dimensional, there are also clinical facts
which must be kept in mind. In certain twilight states, the ap-
pearances of purposeful action may be preserved. However, in
such cases, there are bound to have been previously known and
provable twilight states, often in connection with epilepsy. The
significance of such twilight states, then, will be admitted only
if they are related to pathological processes which have existed
independently of the delinquency at hand.
One should in this respect, always think of the early stages,
which offer difficulties for recognition and diagnosis in psychiatry
as in every other branch of medical science. If the diagnosis is
not easy, that does not exclude the early stage from the picture
of the pathological processes. The beginnings of a definitely
diagnosed psychiatric disease have the same legal consequences
as the fully developed case. But there is a difference between the
early stage, which is a reality, and the so-called disposition which,
in psychiatry, is so often postulated as the cause of the later
disease. The disposition cannot excuse; the disease in its early
manifest stage can. The difference between manifest early stage
and theoretical disposition must be stressed.
Empathy, the subjective aspect as experienced by a third
person, the observer, also belongs to the phenomenal aspects of
the impulsive action. The observer will, in his consciousness or
in his emotional setting, be able or unable to understand impulsive
actions of the evil-doer and will react to them. One must con-
sider misuses of this criterion. One misuse consists in calling
"impulsive" everything we do not understand and cannot grasp
emotionally. Another misuse is that of calling "impulsive" what
we grasp only with a shudder. We are astonished that we can
grasp such things at all, and we let the evil-doer pay for our ap-
parent shortcomings by sentencing him all the harder. Classical
examples may be found in Dostoevski's description of the Kara-
mazov murder. Third, the method of spurious empathy should be
mentioned. It consists in rationalizing emotions and in this way
eliminating them. Thus an emotional crime is interpreted in the
usual criminalistic way. "Would the criminal not have thought




the floor?" "He could not possibly have beaten this person for
any other reason than to slay the witness of his first murder."
Consider the psychology of the expressions of the impulsive
action. The abnormality of the criminal, abnormal impulsive
action can often be found precisely in the fact that it is not di-
rected toward achieving an objective aim. Rather than attaining
an object, some sort of symbolism prevails largely. In other
words, the expressive component which is present in any action
is abnormally stressed; examples are exhibitionism, fetishism,
certain forms of "mad" manslaughter. As has just been said, the
component of expression, of picturing, of abreaction of tension,
is present in any action; however, the abnormality in the im-
pulsive action is that to a very high degree it is bare of rational
motives. The impulsive action is not directed primarily toward
pleasure either; the pleasure, if any, originates from lack of
tension. Only on the basis of experience may pleasure be sought
in such constellations; and, if this is the case, the expressive
factor is gradually reduced. It has been shown in many cases
that the symbolic component becomes so strong because the psy-
chophysical energy in general and the intensity of the urges are
too weak for the achievement of realization.
Concerning motive and motivation, there is the assumption
that an action can be adjudged non-impulsive if a clearcut motive
can be made out. However, isolated motives are another psy-
chological specter, as anything can be motive, and an under-
standable one at that. The husband who traps his wife in flagrante
with her paramour may kill the intruder or the wife or himself
or may forgive one of them or both or silently close the door and
go out, or may take an ax and hit the couch, and he may or may
not bring divorce action. Each of these actions is perfectly
understandable from the angle of an isolated motive and this
shows that this is a sham understanding. Whether there are or
are not isolated motives, impulsiveness cannot be adjudged pres-
ent or not present.
But this does not hold true of real motivation. A motivation
is an average attitude developed in a lasting situation, either by
an individual, or a group or nation or a civilization, at a certain
historical moment. The situation to which the motivation is di-
rected is as important as that motivation itself; in other words,
a motivation is not identical with the character of the personality
or the group. Change the situation, and the motivations change
or become senseless and wither away. Come peace, and the moti-
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vation of the soldier in the combat zone becomes senseless, a
pretense of motivation if not worse. This is one of the reasons
why so-called tail-gunner philosophy can have no place in peace-
ful democratic life. 14 The individual must be able to change his
motivations to develop new ones, often a very painful process.
The individual must-which may be even more painful-harbor
in his chest a number of motivations according to the various
situations in which he has to move, to live, to learn, to act, and
which he feels he has to accept or to dodge, to further, to give in
to, to promote by commission or omission, to avoid or to eradi-
cate.15 The consequence of this concept and of the facts about
the irresistible impulse is that it is not some isolated biological
fact with no sociological aspect. We would not be able to diagnose
the irresistible impulse if we did not take into consideration the
situation and the fact that in this given situation the average in-
dividual has built up motivations-that he has gotten himself to
play a certain role within the situation or that he should have
achieved such role. Thus, the driver who causes an accident and
points to his color blindness could nevertheless be punished for
negligence, because as a driver, and as an adult, he is supposed
to have built up in himself, motivations which-since he knows
that he is color blind-should rightly prevent him from driving.
Again there is clinical experience with persons with certain
character dispositions,'6 suffering from certain clinically-known
disease entities, as neuroses, psychopathies, psychoses, who would
14 Eliasberg, Psychiatry and Propaganda, 101 J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 225 (1945).
15 That such tensions are not spared individuals living under more primitive
conditions than our own has been stressed by Useem, The American Pattern
of Military Government in Micronesia, 51 Am. J. of Sociol. 98. "Even within
the same individual, the traditional and newer modes exist side by side, re-
sulting in mixed emotions and contradictory behavior patterns."
Since 1926 the present author has directed his attention to the inter-
relationships between social conditions under which the individuals of a
group or a people live on the one hand, and the individual character-
formation and neurosis-formation on the other. See Eliasberg, Des Zwangs-
erlebnis und der Sociale Zwang, 126 Z.f.d. Neurol. Psych. 417 (1930).
The interest was centered upon the questions as to how abnormalicies
of the individuals impress themselves on the social institutions and, vice
versa, on how social institutions are contributory forces in the shaping of
the individual abnormalities. My own investigations were based on the ma-
terial gathered by the anthropologist, Richard Thrunwald in his paper,
"Ethnologie und Psychoanalyse" in Hans Prinzhorn, "Auswirkungen der
Psychoanalyse in Wissenschaft und Leben." Der Neue Geist Verlag, Leipsig
(1928). In 1939 Abram Kardiner published his book, "The Individual and
his Society" (Columbia University Press, New York) which took up similar
problems; he based his investigation on collaboration with the American
school of anthropologists.




be lagging in the build-up of their motivations, or would-as one
of their symptoms-suffer from regression to lower levels of
motivation.
There are two principal groups of such cases, one in which
the crime is directly understandable from lagging behind, and
one in which the relationship must be found indirectly. A typical
example of the first kind is found in an hysterical crime, i.e., the
lying of a kleptomaniac; the second case is much more difficult
to understand and much more important. We have, e.g., to deal
with a man who, in the situation of a subordinate official, does
first-rate work, is reliable, honest and efficient, but-as soon as
he becomes independent-defrauds and goes into criminal bank-
ruptcy. It may be understood that this man needs the strings of
a certain dependency and supervision 17 and it may be found that
this trait is connected with a certain neurotic development, with
certain strong ties to his mother or attachment to his wife. Our
man must not interpose the plea of irresistible impulse. His is a
lack of motivation of neurotic origin.
In the practice of the courts, the motivation of the defendant
is often used by the prosecution as additional circumstantial evi-
dence, a famous example for this being the speech of the prose-
cutor in Dostoevski's The Brothers Karamasov. One must in-
deed concede that the motivation as described by the prosecu-
tor makes it highly probable that Karamasov is the culprit.
There is such a strong self-indictment in the motives; e.g., Dimitri
Karamasov thinks the father wants to lure away the son's be-
loved with the money for which the father had cheated the son.
And there are all these antecedent letters and notes and sinister
threats immediately before the deed; no verdict within the frame
of human insight could be different from that which is handed
down by the jury. Another instructive example may be found
in Dreiser's American Tragedy where again the concatenation of
the motives into a clear-cut motivation is shown with almost no
link missing. How should one believe that in the last moment
death was an accident, while there is such a mass of evidence
to prove the guilty intent?
The latter example is theoretically interesting because it
shows that there might be in the last moment an irresistible im-
pulse toward not committing the crime and that is what the
17 Supra note 16.
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defense wants the jury to believe."' The irresistible impulse,
then, can be proved to a certain degree through a close examina-
tion of the character and the situational attitudes of a given
character, i.e., the motivations. Motivations will not, however,
allow us always to rule out irresistible impulses toward (a)
committing a crime and (b) not committing it. As an example
for the former, consider so-called double-existences,-where a
man who otherwise leads a 100 per cent honest life by day, has
a second life where he is connected with underworld gangs.
The problem is often incurred in sexual criminology.
The general result of our present knowledge of the ir-
resistible impulse is that there is nothing mystical about it, that
it can be diagnosed as to its clinical appearance, etiological re-
lationships and facts from the prehistory just as any other con-
dition is diagnosed in clinical medicine and in psychiatry as a
branch of clinical medicine. The following factors were pointed
out.
1. Developmental factors: early appearance; infantilism; no
integration with the personality; no sublimation; no relation-
ship to the milieu.
2. Peculiarities of the aims of the urges; analogies in com-
parative psychology.
3. Periodicity (stereotypic repetition); intensity; peculiari-
ties of inhibitions; constitutional factors; biological factors in-
cluding age; pathological processes.
4. Phenomenology; the irresistible impulse in psychological
experience; (a) emotional graph; (b) consciousness; restriction
of the biological milieu; (c) multi-dimensionality; self-evalua-
tion; self-control; (d) characterology; (e) characterological in-
heritance; (f) the observer's empathy; (g) expressive psychology
of the impulse action.
5. Motive, motivation and irresistible impulse.
6. The question has been raised by the jurists as to the de-
gree to which a given psychotic condition may be considered the
cause of a given criminal action. This question has been discussed
18 There is a parallel irresistible impulse to confess crimes that were or
were not committed, therefore the well-known fact of the untrue confession.
For the clinical circumstances of the untrue self-incrimination, see Elias-
berg, "Psychology of Proof and Evidence" in Smith, "Scientific Proof and
Relations of Law and Medicine," edited by the department of legal medicine
of the Harvard Medical School. This appeared under the title, "Forensic




particularly in cases of paranoid crimes of violence. While one
may assume that competence can be found divided or directed, 19
criminal responsibility should always be considered absent in a
proven psychotic condition. This tenet of psychiatry also holds
for the irresistible impulse. If we can prove that the irresistible
impulse has arisen from the soil of demonstrable abnormality,
the question of the degree in causation becomes senseless and
must be discarded.
7. Method of establishing the various factors under 1-5.
Every medical diagnosis is based (a) on facts perceived by the
medical observer himself and (b) largely on hearsay, i.e., on
information received by the physician from other persons often
not available for testimony and cross-examination at the time
when the physician testifies. Contrary to refreshing his memory
from his notes, which is not hearsay, the physician, if he relies
on the case history, has to tell the court that no diagnosis can
be made on the mere basis of his perceptions. It is wrong for
the court to reject as hearsay, facts from the case history ob-
served by laymen or other physicians or quotations from books
by other authors. The court, rejecting references to anamnestic
material of the described type, is in error about the nature of a
medical diagnosis and the method of arriving at it. It must be
pointed out that the expert testimony is radically different from
the lay witness's testimony in that the latter should as much as
possible rely on his own perceptions, while the former must be
allowed to make plausible inferences from the perceptions of
others not available for cross-examination.
19 Eliasberg, Competency Divided or Directed, 45 (6) J. Crim. Law. & Crim-
inol. (March-April, 1955).
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